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Abstract: White corn garners a premium over commodity corn, but suffers from 
additional price risk and yield drag. Using a simple bootstrap procedure, this research 
considers whether white corn premiums compensate for yield drag and evaluates the 
relative merits of various pre-harvest marketing alternatives including contracts, cross 
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White corn production in the United States has grown to 650,000 acres and 
continues an upward trend based the popularity of snack foods and increased trade with 
Mexico (Illinois Specialty Farm Products Fact Sheet). 
Producers have been encouraged by higher premiums to supply more high quality 
white corn (Keeneth), but these premiums need not ensure profitability. First, the yield of 
white corn is usually less than that of yellow corn, and whether the white corn premium 
can offset revenue losses due to this ￿yield drag￿ is uncertain. A second concern is 
revenue variability due to white corn price fluctuations. Forward contracts establish white 
corn prices to a certain extent, but the net price received for these contracts is typically 
based on a formula that fixes the white corn premium and then adds it to a Chicago Board 
of Trade futures price. The futures price is not determined until after contract singing, 
usually just prior to harvest. As a result, a volatile component of the pricing formula is 
left to fluctuate. In addition, a recent survey suggests that only 60% of Indiana producers 
grow white corn under contract, the remainder rely on cash marketing (Pederson). It is 
hypothesized that these non-contract producers, or ￿wildcatters,￿ face at least as much, if 
not more price volatility than contract producers.  
The objectives of this study are three fold. The first objective establishes whether 
historical white corn premiums are sufficient to overcome white corn￿s yield drag. 
Second, the study examines the viability of cross hedging white corn price risk with No. 
2 yellow corn futures contracts. Even if cross-hedging is viable, the gains from hedging 
may not be sufficient to justify it as a risk management procedure. Therefore, a third 
objective evaluates the merits of several price risk management strategies (e.g. cross hedging cash sales with futures contracts,  combining forward contracts with futures 
contracts) and ranks these alternatives by mean, variance, and 5% Value-at-Risk.  These 
research objectives are useful to white corn producers who market their corn, as well as 
toagribusiness managers who purchase white corn using any one of several marketing 
instruments. To the authors￿ knowledge, no previous studies have addressed these 
objectives in white corn production, although numerous studies exist that address risk 
management in yellow corn.  
Tomek and Peterson provide an extensive literature review of risk management in 
agricultural markets finding many studies that examine hedging effectiveness, optimal 
marketing portfolios, and the performance of marketing strategies. The current study falls 
in the last category; its objectives are more concerned with the relative merits of white 
corn marketing strategies rather than optimal market positions. In this area of the 
literature, Wisner, Blue and Baldwin (1998) simulated returns to corn and soybean 
marketing alternatives for model farms in Iowa and Ohio. The statistically best 
performing alternatives reduced the net revenue coefficient of variation and increased 
mean returns relative to a cash sale at harvest. An increase in mean returns is contrary to 
the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1991), which the authors attribute to a pre-harvest 
price bias created by differences in perceived and probable yields as well as the costs 
associated with information acquisition and use.   
In contrast to the previous study, Zulauf and Irwin found little empirical evidence 
that a price bias exists in pre-harvest futures markets, but suggest producers can benefit 
when using hedging strategies in conjunction with storage decisions.  Zulauf et al. (2001) 
support this conclusion in an empirical study that examined cash flow risk for Ohio corn farms. Even though pre-harvest marketing netted greater returns than cash sales at 
harvest, the returns were not statistically significant and modest when viewed as a 
percentage change from the benchmark.  Collins, Pritchett and Patrick investigate the 
impact that marketing alternatives and crop insurance products have on revenues for a 
corn and soybean farm in central Indiana using an historical, non parametric (i.e. 
bootstrap) procedure as is done in the current study. Results suggest that a combination of 
group insurance coverage and forward pricing may slightly increase mean revenues and 
significantly reduce downside risk.  
As with the previously mentioned research, the current study evaluates returns to 
various marketing strategies, but model farm is set southwestern Indiana. The study￿s 
contribution is its emphasis on white corn revenues, examination of white corn 
premiums, and the evaluation of local cash contract marketing alternatives and futures 
cross hedges. Indeed, cross hedges with yellow corn futures contracts are one marketing 
alternative to be addressed in the current study, and its returns will be compared against a 
benchmark of a cash sale at harvest.   
Empirical cross hedging studies for white corn do not exist, but research has 
considered cross hedges of other crops with yellow corn futures contracts. As an 
example, Witt, Schroeder and Hayenga evaluate sorghum and barley cross hedges while 
investigating three different analytical methods of determining the optimal hedge ratio. 
The authors find a price level linear regression is a suitable method for determining 
optimal cross hedge ratios for anticipatory (pre-harvest) market positions. Graff et al 
examine cross hedges of many agricultural commodities with futures contracts, and in 
particular, cross hedges of milo (sorghum) with corn futures contracts for several locations in Kansas. The authors use a price level linear regression suggesting a high R
2 
and low root mean squared percentage error indicate an effective cross hedge. 
The current study uses a price level, linear regression of local white corn cash 
prices on yellow corn futures prices to determine if sufficient correlation exists to create 
an effective pre-harvest cross hedge. The study then evaluates the cross hedge as one 
marketing alternative among a set of alternatives using a non-parametric, historical 
simulation of a white corn production enterprise in southern Indiana. Marketing 
alternatives are evaluated according to the moments of their respective net revenue 
distributions, and while it may be the case that cross hedges are deemed effective by 
simple linear regression, hedging costs, premium risk, and yield risk may render it 
ineffectual as a risk management tool. 
Analytical Framework 
  Two decision periods exist in the analytical framework: a spring decision period 
and a harvest delivery period in the fall. In the spring, producers may choose to initiate a 
particular marketing strategy given that harvest prices and yields are unknown. In the 
second period, yields and harvest prices are realized and the crop is delivered to the 
contractor or sold in the cash market. Proceeds from the harvest cash sale, from positions 
taken in the futures market, or contract fulfillment are received at time of delivery. Four 
different marketing options are available to producers: a simple harvest cash sale, 
hedging a portion of the crop using yellow corn futures contracts (i.e. cross-hedging), 
signing a contract in the spring for a portion of the crop selling the remainder at harvest, 
and using a combination of a contract and cross-hedging.
1 The following subsections 
outline net returns from each marketing alternative and associated revenue risk.  Net return equations used in the next subsection are the basis of the subsequent empirical 
procedure. 
Harvest Cash Sale Net Returns 
Proceeds from a harvest cash sale depend on the harvest price, white corn yield, 
the scale of operation and production costs: 
() ( ) q c q y p − = ~ ~ ~ 1 1 π  
where  1
~ p is the stochastic price for white corn and the subscript 1 indicates the harvest 
delivery period. The stochastic yield,  y ~, is multiplied by a scale variable q to arrive at 
total white corn production. Costs of white corn production,  () q c , are the same regardless 
of the marketing method. 
  As noted by Li, purchasers quote white corn cash prices () 1
~ p  as a premium added 
to the daily Chicago Board of Trade settlement price for No 2. yellow corn futures 
contracts: 
() 1 1 1
~ ~ ~ 2 b f p + =  
with  1
~
f  as the stochastic futures price realized at harvest delivery and  1
~
b is the stochastic 
premium received at harvest. Similarly, local prices of yellow corn are determined as the 
sum of the yellow corn futures price and the local basis. Thus, one can treat the premium 
found in equation 2 as a basis, and its stochastic nature as basis risk.   Therefore, equation 
(1) computes white corn net returns as a result of a harvest cash sale, which can be 
compared to the net returns from yellow corn cash sales. If white corn net returns exceed 
those of yellow corn, then the harvest premium has compensated for yield drag.  Net Returns of Cross-Hedging  
  Cross-hedging white corn cash positions with yellow corn futures contracts are an 
opportunity to manage white corn price risk. When cross-hedging, producers sell yellow 
corn futures contracts in the spring period, and offset the positions during the harvest 
period. A producer￿s net revenues while cross-hedging may be written as: 
() ( ) () q c h f f q y p − − + = 1 0 1
~ ~ ~ ~ 3 π  
where  0 f  is the delivery month￿s futures settlement price at the time the cross-hedge is 
initiated, a price known to the producer. The difference  1 0
~
f f −  represents the per unit 
returns to the cross hedge, and h is the quantity of yellow corn futures bushels used in 
the cross hedge.
2 
  Equation 3 is a familiar representation of a producer￿s net returns when hedging 
in the presence of futures price risk, basis risk and yield risk. The ability of the cross 
hedge to mitigate revenue risk depends importantly on the relationship between white 
corn yields and the yellow corn futures price, as well as the relationship between white 
corn yields and white corn premiums. If the white corn yields were known with certainty 
(i.e.  y y = ~ ), a full hedge () q y h =  reduces () 3  to: 
() ( ) () q c q y b f a − + = 1 0
~ ~ 3 π  
in which the only stochastic variable is the white corn premium  1 b . Thus, cross hedges 
are tools for mitigating futures price risk, but leave premium risk unchecked. 
Net Returns for White Corn Contracts 
  Producers may also sign cash contracts in the spring with local purchasers for the 
harvest delivery of their crop. As reported by Li, these contracts set the white corn premium in the spring () 0 b , but allow the futures price to be determined at or a short time 
before delivery
3. Net returns to contracting are written as: 
() ( ) ( ) () q c w b f w q y p − + + − = 0 1 1
~ ~ ~ ~ 4 π   
where ( ) 0 1
~
b f +  is the contract price per unit for the contract quantity  w. The term 
() w q y p − ~ ~
1  is the revenue generated by white corn quantities in excess of the contract 
amount; should the contracted amount be less than actual production () w q y < , producers 
still need to satisfy the contractual obligation by either purchasing the difference at the 
existing market price  1 p , or by a simple cash settlement equal to the value of the 
shortfall. If the contracted amount is exactly equal to the actual production () w q y =  
equation () 4  is reduced to: 
() ( ) () q c q y b f a − + = 0 1
~ ~ 4 π  
with the premium risk eliminated and the futures price serving as the only stochastic 
element. 
Returns to a Combination Strategy 
In an effort to mitigate both futures price risk and premium risk, producers might 
choose to use a white corn contract in conjunction with a cross hedge. Returns to this 
combination are expressed as: 
() ( ) ( ) () ( ) q c w b f h f f w q y p o − + + − + − = 0 1 1 1
~ ~ ~ ~ 5 π . 
Assuming that the cross hedged quantity and the contracted quantity are the same (i.e. 
w h = )
4 and using the white corn cash price equation () 2 , equation () 5  is simplified to: 
() ( ) ( ) { } () q c w b b f f q y p a − − + − + = 1 0 1 0 1
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 5 π  where the term ( ) 1 0
~
f f −  is the per unit return to hedging, while the term  ( ) 1 0
~
b b −  
represents the difference between white corn premiums quoted in the spring and 
stochastic premiums in the Fall.  In the special case in which actual production equals the 
contracted amount, () a 5  is reduced to: 
() ( ) ( ) q c w b f c − + = 0 0 5 π  
As illustrated by () c 5 , the combination of a white corn contract and cross hedge mitigates 
both futures price risk and premium risk in the spring decision period. Of course, yield 
risk remains with this, as well as all, marketing alternatives, and has not been represented 
in the special case (equation 5c). 
  Equations (1), (3), (4) and (5) demonstrate white corn production profits using 
various marketing alternatives. In sum, a harvest cash sale bears yield risk, futures price 
risk and premium risk (equation 1). Cross-hedging mitigates futures price risk, but 
premium risk and yield risk remain unchecked (equation 3). Use of white corn contracts 
mitigates premium risk leaving yield risk and futures price risk (equation 4), while the 
combination strategy represents a means of addressing both futures price and premium 
risk (equation 5). The objective of this research is to compare the relative merits of each 
marketing alternative, so equations (1), (3), (4) and (5) will be used to compute each 
alternative￿s historical net return distribution using a bootstrap  simulation procedure. 
Alternatives may then be compared according to several criteria including mean/variance 
efficiency, stochastic dominance and Value at Risk. In addition, a net return distribution 
for No. 2 yellow corn is simulated in order to determine if white corn premiums have 
historically compensated for the yield drag associated with white corn production.
5  Bootstrap Procedure and Data 
  The representative white corn enterprise is located in Warrick County, Indiana, 
and is comprised of 1,000 acres.
6 A bootstrap simulation procedure is used to generate 
the net return for each marketing alternative based on equations (1), (3), (4) and (5).  The 
specific marketing alternatives are listed in Table 1, and these alternatives represent three 
different contract amounts (33%, 66%, 100% of expected production) as well as two 
different initiation dates (March 15
th, May 15
th).  Table 1 lists 20 different marketing 
alternatives in total including benchmarks of a white corn and yellow corn cash sale at 
harvest. Stochastic variables in the model include an historical year generator, white corn 
yields, and yellow corn yields.  
A model iteration begins when an historical year is chosen at random from the set 
1986 - 2000.
 Once the year is selected, that year￿s white corn yield and yellow corn yield 
are randomly generated using a process described below.  The historical year￿s white 
corn cash price, yellow corn cash price, and yellow corn futures prices are then drawn 
from a data set. Net returns for each marketing alternative are computed, and the model is 
iterated one thousand times. Each iteration￿s net return is collected to form a net return 
distribution  
Raw data for white corn and yellow corn yields are taken from plot trials in 
Warrick County, Indiana during the years 1986-2000
7. The Warrick County corn trials 
are organized by the Purdue University Cooperative Extension Service for the 
comparison of commercial corn hybrids, which are planted by a local farming operation. 
In any given year, roughly 50 white corn hybrids and 100 yellow corn hybrids are planted 
and harvested. For the purpose of random variable generation, the mean yield of each year is computed and the individual hybrid￿s yields are subtracted from the mean. The 
remainder is an error that is then converted to a percent error. Each percent error is 
assigned an equal probability, and these errors form an empirical distribution.  
Once the historical year is chosen during a model iteration, that year￿s mean white 
corn and yellow corn yields are selected from the data. Next, one of the percent errors is 
drawn from the distribution and added to the mean. The sum becomes the iteration￿s 
yield.  
Cash price data are gathered from the Grain and Feed Market News published by 
USDA￿s Agricultural Marketing Service. The data are simple averages of monthly 
closing bid prices by country elevators in Kentucky
8. It is assumed that all of the cash 
grain is marketed in November.  
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) December corn prices are collected at three 
selected dates for each year over the 1986-2000 time period.  The dates include an early 
spring futures contract price (March 15), a later spring futures contract price (May 15), 
and a harvest time futures price (November 15)
9.  Applicable commission and brokerage 
service fees were assumed to reflect current conditions.  A 7.5% margin requirement was 
assumed for a producer￿s hedging account.  For most brokerage services, margin 
accounts do not collect interest, thereby the producer must sacrifice interest for the period 
of time the hedge was active.  The annual interest rate charged to margin accounts was 
assumed to be 9% in this model.   
  When hedging with futures contracts, a producer does not know the quantity that 
will be produced in the upcoming fall, but on March 15 he/she must decide how many 
contracts to enter.  Cross hedges and cash contracts are assumed to be 33%, 66%, or 100% of expected production.  For modeling purposes, the expected yield is a moving 
average of the previous three years￿ production levels.  If total production exceeds the 
contracted amount, the remainder is sold on the cash market; if grain is over-contracted 
(production is less than the contracted amount), then additional bushels are purchased at 
harvest prices to fulfill the contract. 
  White corn contract bid prices were unavailable for this study. In order to 
approximate the premiums, the current year￿s premium quoted in the spring (either 
March 15
th or May 15
th) is the moving average of the fall premiums for the previous three 
years. Under this assumption, white corn buyers naively set spring premiums equal to 
past history without the benefit of price forecasts, and there is no advantage to 
contracting on March 15
th vs. May 15
th. A sensitivity analysis in the results section 
explores the ramifications of this assumption. 
  Net revenues are calculated for the 20 marketing alternatives using the procedure 
and data described above.  Each iteration￿s net revenue is collected, and 1000 model 
iterations result in a distribution of net revenues that may be compared using several 
criteria. The next section reports the results of the comparison, first comparing white corn 
cash sales to yellow corn cash sales, and then a comparison of marketing alternatives 
versus the white corn cash sale benchmark. 
Results 
White Corn Yield Drag and Premiums 
  An objective is to determine whether white corn premiums have historically 
compensated for lesser yields relative to traditional yellow corn production.  To this end, 
net returns from a harvest cash sale of yellow corn are subtracted from white corn net returns in each model iteration. A negative difference indicates yellow corn is more 
profitable than white corn, a positive difference indicates the opposite. Each iteration￿s 
difference is collected, and the collection is sorted to form the cumulative distribution 
function found in Figure 1. 
  Values of the net return difference in Figure 1 range from  -$156.92 per acre to 
$255.84 per acre with a mean of $37.23 per acre. Negative net return differences occur 
25% of the time; that is, yellow corn net returns exceed white corn net returns in 25% of 
the bootstrap simulations. Consequently, the white corn premium compensates for yield 
drag in 75% of model simulations.  
White Corn Price Level Regression 
   A simple price level regression of the white corn cash price on the yellow corn 
futures contract price for the harvest date is used to determine if the sufficient correlation 
exists to warrant cross hedging: 
()
() () 48 . 0 09 . 1
46 . 1 54 . 0 6 t t FC WC + − =
. 
In equation (6), WC is the white corn cash price, and FC the futures price. Standard errors 
appear in parenthesis below regression coefficients. The R
2 for equation (6) is 0.53 
indicating some correlation exists between the variables, while the root mean squared 
percent error percent (RMSPE) is 0.41.  The RMSPE is a measure of dispersion that the 
actual cash price has around the expected futures price; thus we conclude that using 
equation (6) means the actual cash price will be within 41% of the futures price 68% 
percent of the time. Regression results suggest some correlation exists between the white 
corn cash price and yellow corn futures price, but sufficient variation exists such that cross hedging may actually be more risky relative to other marketing alternatives whose 
results are described in the next section   
Comparing White Corn Marketing Alternatives 
  The final objective is to compare marketing alternatives found in Table 1 
according to mean, variance and 5% Value-at-Risk. Strategies will be compared to each 
of these criteria in turn, and full results are enumerated in Table 2. 
  A desirable marketing alternative decreases risk and increases net returns relative 
to the benchmark. A risk-return tradeoff is expected however; that is, if a strategy 
transfers white corn price risk to another party (i.e. the futures market or a local purchaser 
via cash contract) then the other party should receive compensation and net returns to the 
producer will fall. Thus, marketing alternatives that reduce risk should suffer from lower 
net returns relative to the harvest benchmark. 
  The mean and standard deviation of net returns distributions are used as the 
measure of risk and return for the marketing alternatives considered in the current study 
and are summarized in Figure 2.  The origin of the scatter plot in Figure 2 is the mean net 
return and standard deviation of the benchmark, of a harvest cash sale of white corn 
($231.28 per acre and $95.03 per acre respectively).  The mean and standard deviation of 
other marketing alternatives are plotted with respect to the benchmark, and each 
marketing alternative￿s code is found next to that point. A list of codes is provided in 
Table 2. 
  Using Figure 2, there are six strategies that generate net greater returns than the 
benchmark, and at the same time reduce the standard deviation of returns. These 
alternatives include all of the options positions (O100, O66, O33), and the contract alternatives (CE100, CE66, CE33). The mean net return of each of these alternatives, an 
indeed all of the strategies, is statistically different than that of the benchmark at the 95% 
confidence level. 
Contracts (CE100, CE66, CE33) tend to reduce risk by locking in white corn cash 
premiums earlier rather than waiting until harvest. Notably, the contract alternatives 
increase net returns and reduce their standard deviation relative to the cash sale at 
harvest, even when a contract is signed for an amount equal to one hundred percent of 
expected production.
10 
It is more difficult to explain the performance of option alternatives. Options have 
the advantage of fixing a price floor at the nearest at-the-money strike price, but allow the 
producer to take advantage of price increases unlike futures hedges. The cost of the 
option is its premium, and the option premium varies according to its intrinsic value and 
time value. The volatility of the market influences the option￿s time value, increased 
volatility leads to greater time value and larger option premiums.  Thus, while an option 
can set a price floor and allow traders to capture gains from price increases, option 
premiums tend to reduce overall net returns in the face of greater volatility. Interestingly, 
white corn prices are much more volatile than yellow corn futures prices, but the yellow 
corn option price does not reflect white corn￿s price volatility. As a result, the yellow 
corn options are relatively cheap for the cross-hedge, and this may explain why the 
option alternatives perform well in the bootstrap simulation. 
Unlike the previously mentioned alternatives in the upper left quadrant of Figure 
2, there are strategies that decrease returns and increase risk, and these are plotted in the 
lower right-hand quadrant. All of the futures hedging strategies fall into this category (WHE100, WHE66, WHE33 and WHL100, WHL66, WHL33), suggesting that fixing the 
futures price does not sufficiently reduce overall revenue volatility, and that the 
opportunity cost of the cross-hedges (an inability to take advantage of higher prices) 
outweighs its benefits. In addition, a contract and cross hedge combination alternative for 
100% of expected production (CML100, CME100) also tends to reduce returns and 
increase risk relative to the benchmark.  
As mentioned previously, a risk-return tradeoff is hypothesized so that 
alternatives that decrease the variability of returns will also decrease mean net returns. 
The tradeoff is true for the alternatives that appear in the lower left quadrant of Figure 2. 
All of these alternatives are contract-cross hedge combinations (CML 33, CML 66, CME 
33,CME 66) with the exception of the yellow corn harvest cash sale (YC). 
  Figure 2 provides a broad illustration of the risk and returns that marketing 
alternatives have relative to the cash sale at harvest benchmark. However, producers are 
often concerned with the likelihood that they may face a year with poor net returns. This 
concern is addressed when the simulated net return distributions are evaluated using 
Value-at-Risk in the next section. 
5% Value-at-Risk Analysis 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) analysis can be used to evaluate the downside risk potential 
of various marketing alternatives. VaR is a financial measure that focuses specifically on 
the lower tail of a distribution of net returns. Increasingly popular in the finance 
literature, researchers have recently used VaR for agricultural applications
11.  The top ten 
marketing alternatives, as ranked by 5% VaR, are shown in Figure 3.  In Figure 3, the light cross-hatched bars are the 5% VaR level of the marketing 
alternative expressed as a percentage of the benchmark. The mean net returns of each 
alternative are the darker bar found directly below an alternative￿s VaR bar. Those 
alternatives with the greatest 5% VaR levels are found at the bottom of the chart. 
As illustrated by Figure 3, seven strategies have higher 5% VaR levels than the 
benchmark, three of which are options alternatives, three are contract alternatives, and 
one is a combination of a futures cross-hedge and contract. Options strategies perform the 
best in terms of 5% VaR, with the Options Hedge 100 alternative having a 5% VaR that 
is 143% of the benchmark strategy. More specifically, the options strategy has a 5% VaR 
of $118.80 per acre (see Table 2) meaning there is a 5% chance this alternative will lose 
$118.80 per acre in any given simulation. Stated differently, this strategy has a 95% 
chance of netting more than $188.80 per acre. The benchmark strategy has a 5% VaR of 
only  $83.09, a difference of nearly $50 per acre. Producers would generally favor the 
option strategy over the white corn cash sale at harvest especially given the options 
strategies do not reduce, but rather improve, mean net returns. In a similar vein, the 
contract strategy is preferred to the cash sale at harvest if the focus is downside risk; the 
contracts fix white corn premiums, a volatile component of white corn prices. Recalling 
that the white corn premium is assumed, a sensitivity analysis is performed. Reducing the 
premiums by a standard deviation does not change the 5% VaR ranking of contract 
alternatives relative to the benchmark, but does reduce its mean net returns as discussed 
in endnote 11. Conclusions and Caveats 
  White corn production may generate additional revenues for producers beyond 
commodity corn production, but additional risks should be recognized. The current study 
examines two sources of risk in white corn revenues relative to commodity corn (i.e., 
premium risks and yield drag), and examines the relative merits of marketing alternatives 
that might be used to overcome these risks. 
  A bootstrap simulation procedure is used to determine the net revenue difference 
between harvest cash sales of white corn and yellow corn. Computing the difference is 
one method for determining if the additional premium paid to white corn overcomes its 
yield drag relative to yellow corn varieties. In 75% of the simulations, the net revenue 
generated by white corn was higher than that of yellow corn suggesting that premiums 
generally overcome the loss in yield drag. 
  The same bootstrap procedure computes the net returns to various marketing 
alternatives including futures cross-hedges, cash forward contracts, combinations of 
futures cross-hedges and contracts, and options cross-hedges. Options cross-hedges 
outperform the benchmark and all other alternatives in terms of mean net returns and 5% 
Value-at-Risk. Perhaps the options strategies perform well because the premium paid for 
options does not fully reflect the risk of white corn production, as well as the fact that 
option strategies tend to set price floors but allow for upside potential. This matter can be 
addressed in future research, perhaps by computing hypothetical premiums for white corn 
options and comparing them to historical values of yellow corn options. Cross-hedges 
using yellow corn futures contracts consistently perform poorly in terms of mean net 
returns and 5% VaR relative to the benchmark. Poor performance may be largely due to insufficient correlation between white corn cash prices and yellow corn futures prices, the 
volatility of white corn premiums, and the opportunity cost of futures contract cross-
hedges.  
  The current study is a beginning point; further research may address some of this 
study￿s limitations. A weakness of the current study is its use of a bootstrap simulation 
procedure to approximate the historical correlations between white corn yields, white 
corn prices and yellow corn yields. Obviously, results of this study are most relevant to 
past history, and are reliable to the extent that future relationships between prices and 
yields is similar to the past. The bootstrap procedure is used primarily due to the expense 
and difficulty of acquiring data for a structural econometric model that might be used to 
generate relevant price data. It is unknown how or if a structural model would improve 
the accuracy of the results given a reliance on historical data. 
  In addition, the current study￿s use of local yields limit how conclusions might be 
generalized to other areas such as the western Corn Belt. The use of southwest Indiana 
data does, however, give an more accurate portrayal of farm level risk, which would be 
lost if an aggregate model were used. The model is particularly relevant to white corn 
production in the eastern Corn Belt, which is a major white corn production area. 
  An interesting research extension might consider storage returns of post harvest 
marketing alternatives. In post harvest period, yellow corn futures prices tend to increase 
overt time to compensate for storage costs, and there is less variability in futures prices. 
At the same time, the white corn market becomes focused on international production, 
especially South African production, and white corn prices may be more volatile.  Citations 
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1 Analysis of another alternative, hedging with options, is found in Li (2001). 
Additionally, analysis is focused primarily on pre-harvest hedging; Li has also examined 
post-harvest strategies. 
2 Equation () 3  omits explicit consideration of hedging costs such as brokerage fees and 
the opportunity cost of margin deposits. However these costs may be considered a 
reduction in the per unit return to hedging, and the costs are included in the empirical 
procedure. 
3 White corn forward contracts are very similar to basis contracts used to market yellow 
corn. 
4 A na￿ve assumption but is useful in the empirical analysis when comparing various 
market alternatives (explain this better). An optimal approach would maximize (5) within 
in an expected utility framework choosing both the quantity hedged and the quantity 
contracted. However, the purpose of this research is not to select an optimal hedging 
portfolio, but rather to demonstrate the potential risk reduction effects of various 
marketing alternatives.                                                                                                                                                  
5 The net return for yellow corn is calculated using equation () 1,  w i t h   1
~ p  as the yellow 
corn cash price, (this cash price is the sum of the yellow corn futures price and the local 
yellow corn basis ( ) 1 1
~ ~
b f + , and  y  is the yellow corn yield. The scale of production qis 
held constant for both yellow corn and white corn, but yellow corn costs of production 
() q c  replace white corn costs of production. 
6 Warrick County is located in southwest Indiana, a region of the state in which white 
corn production is prevalent. Southwest Indiana has many barge locations along the Ohio 
River that allow access to international and domestic markets as well as local white corn 
processors. 
7 Weather problems prevented harvest in 1997, so this year is omitted from the dataset 
and from model iterations. Specifically, rain at planting eliminated corn stands and the 
plot committee does not have the ability to replant. 
8 Kentucky cash price bids are the nearest geographic substitute for southwestern Indiana 
cash price bids. Southwestern Indiana cash price bids are not publicly available, but are 
closely tied to the Kentucky prices that also include elevator bids along the Ohio River.  
9 If the March 15th futures price did not occur on a Wednesday, then the closest 
Wednesday settlement price was selected.  
10 Recall that option premiums were unavailable for the current study, so contract 
premiums were set as the moving average of the previous three years. To determine the 
limitations of these assumptions, a sensitivity analysis was performed in which premiums 
were reduced by a standard deviation, or $0.22 per bushel. The change reduced the mean 
net returns of the contract alternatives, but did not influence the standard deviation of net 
returns. All of the contract alternatives are shifted into the lower-left hand quadrant of                                                                                                                                                 
Figure 2, with the larger contract amounts (i.e. 100% of expected production) shifter 
further than the smaller contracted amounts. 




(% of  expected 
production) 
Quantity Contracted 




a  N/A N/A  N/A 
Cross Hedge Early  33%, 66%, 100%  N/A  March 15th 
Cross Hedge Late  33%, 66%, 100%  N/A  May 15th 
Options Hedge Early  33%, 66%, 100%  N/A  March 15th 
Contract Early  N/A  33%, 66%, 100%  March 15th 
Contract Late  N/A  33%, 66%, 100%  May 15th 
Combination Early  33%, 66%, 100%  33%, 66%, 100%  March 15th 
Combination Late  33%, 66%, 100%  33%, 66%, 100%  May 15th 


































25 % Probability 
  of Yellow Corn Returns
  Exceeding White Corn ReturnsTable 2.  Selected Summary Statistics of the Net Return Distributions 
for Various Marketing Alternatives. 
Strategy 




as % of 
WC 
5% VaR 
as % of 
WC 
Yellow Corn 
Cash Sales  YC   $ 194.06   $   76.00   $   82.07  84% 80% 99%
White Corn 
Cash Sales  WC   $ 231.29   $   95.03   $   83.09  100% 100% 100%
White Hedge 
33% March  WHE33   $ 216.60   $ 100.60   $   57.99  94% 106% 70%
White Hedge 
66% March  WHE66   $ 201.87   $ 108.72   $   35.38  87% 114% 43%
White Hedge 
100% March  WHE100   $ 186.75   $ 119.14   $    8.81   81% 125% 11%
White Hedge 
33% June  WHL33   $ 218.43   $   96.57   $   67.42  94% 102% 81%
White Hedge 
66% June  WHL66   $ 205.53   $ 101.01   $   50.69  89% 106% 61%
White Hedge 
100% June  WH100   $ 192.30   $ 108.18   $   34.45  83% 114% 41%
Contract     
33% March  CE33   $ 235.20   $   83.47   $ 103.42  102% 88% 124%
Contract    
66%  March  CE66   $ 239.12   $   78.39   $ 109.84  103% 82% 132%
Contract    
100%  March  CE100   $ 243.15   $   81.21   $ 107.49  105% 85% 129%
Combination 
33% March  CME33   $ 220.51   $   88.55   $   77.70  95% 93% 94%
Combination 
66% March  CME66   $ 209.71   $   89.86   $   58.55  91% 95% 70%
Combination 
100% March  CME100   $ 198.62   $   98.93   $   30.72  86% 104% 37%
Combination 
33% June  CML33   $ 222.34   $   85.28   $   83.93  96% 90% 101%
Combination 
66% June  CML66   $ 213.37   $   85.79   $   67.00  92% 90% 81%
Combination 
100% June  CML100   $ 204.16   $   96.79   $   41.67  88% 102% 50%
Options 
Hedge 33%  O33   $ 236.36   $   89.89   $   95.41  102% 95% 115%
Options 
Hedge 66%  O66   $ 241.79   $   85.46   $ 107.71  105% 90% 130%
Options 
Hedge 100% O100   $ 246.91   $   82.22   $ 118.80  107% 87% 143%
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